Credential vaulting — Built for autonomous agents
AICredVault brokers credentials to AI agents at execution time. The secret is injected into the action, not the conversation — so it never enters prompt context, never reaches a model provider, and never lands in a transcript, a log, or a memory file.
“A secret in a prompt is a secret in a third party’s database. The only safe place for a credential is somewhere the model cannot read.”
The problem
Give an agent an API key in its instructions and that key is sent to the model provider on every turn. It is stored, cached, and retrievable — by whoever can read that provider’s logs.
Agents write what they know into journals, summaries, and handoff files. A credential pasted once is copied forward indefinitely, into places nobody audits.
Shared logins mean you cannot tell which agent did what, cannot revoke one without revoking all, and cannot answer the only question an auditor asks: who acted?
Without a receipt per use, credential abuse is indistinguishable from normal operation. You find out at the breach, not at the action.
How it works
The agent requests an action, not a secret. AICredVault resolves the credential, injects it into the execution path, and returns only the result. The value never crosses into the model’s context window.
The agent names the action it needs — connect to this database, sign this artifact, call this API. It asks for capability, never for a value.
The broker checks the requesting principal against the access policy for that credential. Denied requests are recorded, not silently dropped.
The credential is resolved and passed directly to the executor. It exists in the process performing the work, not in the conversation that requested it.
Every use writes a tamper-evident record: who, what, when, and the outcome. The secret itself is never written to the receipt.
Controls
Secret never in context
Credentials are resolved at execution time and injected into the action. There is no prompt containing the value, so there is nothing for a provider, a transcript, or a memory file to leak.
Multi-principal access control
Every agent gets a distinct identity with its own scoped entitlements. Revoke one agent without touching the others, and answer “which agent used this credential” from the record rather than from memory.
Tamper-evident receipts
Each brokered action writes a receipt capturing the principal, the action, the time, and the outcome. Receipts are chained so a modified or removed record is detectable.
Break-glass
A documented emergency path lets an authorized human act when the broker is unavailable. It is explicit, logged, and separate from normal agent operation — not a hidden backdoor.
Runs inside your network. Your credentials stay on your hardware, under your key management and your backup policy.
Get started
Tell us what your agents connect to and how credentials are managed today. We will map the exposure and show you the brokered path.
Talk to us about AICredVault